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Young Euro-Atlantic Resilience Strategy 2035

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Young Euro-Atlantic Resilience Strategy 2035

Young Perspectives on the Future of the Euro-Atlantic Order After the Rupture

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WORKSHOP

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Executive Summary

The **Young Euro-Atlantic Resilience Strategy 2035** sets out a strategic framework for strengthening the resilience, legitimacy and capacity to act of the Euro-Atlantic community in a period of structural change. It joins young perspectives on the challenges shaping the future of the Euro-Atlantic order and the choices required by 2035. It is built upon a participant-driven workshop that was organised by YATA Slovenia at the Young Bled Strategic Forum 2026.

The Strategy addresses six interconnected domains. Across these domains, it identifies five principal challenges: erosion of trust and institutional legitimacy; strategic dependencies and constraints on European capacity to act; insufficient preparedness for interconnected security threats; information manipulation and technological disruption; and climate-related systemic vulnerability.

Ten Strategic Principles provide the common framework for responding to these challenges. They emphasise legitimacy and trust; shared responsibility for security; strategic resilience without isolation; greater capacity to act; reciprocal and diversified partnerships; an adaptive transatlantic relationship; meaningful inclusion and agency; pragmatic engagement grounded in fundamental principles; and shared responsibility for long-term transformation.

These principles provide a common framework for the Strategic Priorities for 2035 and corresponding Policy Recommendations across the six domains. The Strategy calls for stronger defence capabilities and societal preparedness; resilient and accountable democratic institutions; greater resilience to information manipulation and technological disruption; diversified economic relationships and secure supply chains; climate action aligned with resilience, competitiveness and social cohesion; and stronger social trust, public services and meaningful participation. Indicators of Progress provide a basis for assessing implementation.

Throughout the Strategy, young professionals are recognised as a present source of strategic capacity. Their agency should extend beyond representation and consultation towards contributing to decision-making, assuming responsibility, applying expertise and innovation, and connecting generations, institutions and societies.

The Strategy follows a clear progression: risks identify what must be addressed; principles guide how choices should be made; priorities define the direction of change; recommendations provide pathways for action; and indicators allow progress to be assessed. Together, they support a Euro-Atlantic order that is more resilient without becoming isolated, more capable without compromising democratic accountability, and more adaptable while retaining the principles on which its legitimacy depends.

The objective for 2035 is to move from rupture to agency: strengthening the capacity to defend what remains essential, adapt what must change and rethink what no longer meets the demands of the strategic environment.

Strategic Context: The Rupture in a Global Perspective

The international environment is undergoing structural transformation. The concept of "rupture" in this Strategy refers to a broader disruption of assumptions, relationships and institutional arrangements that have shaped the Euro-Atlantic order, rather than to a single crisis or event. Russia's war against Ukraine, geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, pressure on democratic institutions, strategic dependencies, climate-related risks and societal fragmentation are challenging established approaches to security, cooperation and resilience.

The post-Cold War period was characterised by expectations of expanding international cooperation, economic interdependence and a multilateral, rules-based international system. Today, the strategic environment is increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition, fragmentation and more transactional relations. Technological development is transforming economic and military power, while vulnerabilities in supply chains, energy systems and strategic resources demonstrate that interdependence can be both a source of prosperity and vulnerability.

The challenge extends beyond responding to individual crises. Security threats increasingly interact across economic, technological, political, societal and environmental domains, making resilience a cross-sectoral challenge involving both institutions and societies. At the same time, the future of the Euro-Atlantic order cannot be considered solely from within the Euro-Atlantic community. Its resilience and legitimacy also depend on how it engages with different interests and perspectives in an increasingly plural international environment.

The central question is therefore not how the existing order can simply be preserved, but **what remains essential, what must adapt and what may need to be fundamentally rethought**. Democratic accountability, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, collective defence and international cooperation remain important foundations of Euro-Atlantic resilience. The challenge towards 2035 is to preserve these foundations while strengthening the capacity of institutions and societies to adapt and act under conditions of continued uncertainty and transformation.

Methodology and Synthesis Process

The **Young Euro-Atlantic Resilience Strategy 2035** is based on a participant-driven strategic workshop organised by YATA Slovenia at the Young Bled Strategic Forum 2026 in Kranjska Gora on 29 August 2026. The workshop moved from interpreting the current period of rupture to identifying priorities and developing recommendations for the future of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Participants worked across six domains:

1. Security and Defence;
2. Democracy and Institutional Resilience;
3. Technology and the Information Space;
4. Economic Security and Supply Chains;
5. Climate and Disaster Resilience;
6. Societal Cohesion and Youth Agency.

Each group examined rupture within its respective domain, identified **Key Risks and Structural Challenges**, and developed three **Strategic Priorities for 2035** and three **Policy Recommendations**. The main conclusions were subsequently brought together in plenary to identify connections across the six dimensions of Euro-Atlantic resilience.

YATA Slovenia then conducted a structured synthesis of the outputs generated by participants and plenary discussion, identifying cross-cutting challenges, recurring priorities and values, and areas of convergence and divergence. This process formed the basis for the ten **Strategic Principles for Euro-Atlantic Resilience**.

The Strategy therefore distinguishes between the Key Risks and Structural Challenges, Strategic Priorities and Policy Recommendations, which originate from the thematic group discussions and have been consolidated and edited for clarity, and the Strategic Principles, which represent YATA Slovenia's cross-cutting synthesis.

YATA Slovenia's role as author has been to structure and consolidate these perspectives into a coherent strategic framework. The Strategy should not be understood as a consensus statement endorsed in every detail by all participants.

Key Risks and Structural Challenges

1. Erosion of Trust, Social Polarisation and Institutional Legitimacy

Erosion of trust across institutions, societies and the international system weakens the foundations of collective resilience. Limited transparency, weak public services, political uncertainty and a growing disconnect between decision-makers and citizens can undermine confidence in public authorities. Polarisation, intolerance, hate speech and difficulties with integration can further weaken social cohesion and the capacity for collective action.

Similar dynamics extend beyond the domestic level. Diverging national interests can complicate collective European responses, particularly during crises. Internationally, perceptions of inconsistent application of rules and the growing prominence of power politics can weaken confidence in the legitimacy and credibility of the existing international order.

Trust is therefore not simply a question of public confidence, but a strategic condition for legitimacy, social cohesion and the capacity to act collectively during periods of disruption.

2. Strategic Dependencies and European Capacity to Act

Europe's economic, technological, resource and security dependencies represent a strategic vulnerability. Exposure in areas such as energy, critical raw materials, semiconductors and defence capabilities can become particularly consequential when economic interdependence intersects with geopolitical competition or disruption.

External dependencies are compounded by internal constraints. Fragmented political interests, regulatory complexity and slow decision-making can limit Europe's ability to translate its economic and political weight into timely strategic action. The evolving transatlantic security environment adds another dimension, particularly regarding the distribution of security responsibilities and Europe's capacity to assume greater responsibility for its own security.

The challenge is therefore to reduce critical dependencies and strengthen European capacity to act without undermining the benefits of openness, interdependence and international cooperation.

3. Preparedness, Resilience and Interconnected Security Threats

Gaps in preparedness for major disruptions constitute an important vulnerability. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked a major shift in the European security environment and reinforced the importance of defence capabilities, credible deterrence, resilience and long-term security planning.

Preparedness, however, extends beyond conventional military threats. Economic disruption, climate-related emergencies, foreign interference, hybrid threats and attacks on critical infrastructure can interact and reinforce one another. Economic shocks can generate social and political consequences, geopolitical tensions can expose critical dependencies, and information manipulation can undermine institutional trust.

These interactions increase the risk of compound crises that cross institutional and policy boundaries. Resilience therefore depends on anticipation, preparedness, coordination and the capacity of institutions and societies to absorb, adapt to and recover from shocks.

4. Information Manipulation and Technological Disruption

The changing information environment presents a growing challenge to institutional resilience and social cohesion. Propaganda, disinformation and other forms of information manipulation can exploit existing divisions, reinforce competing narratives and weaken confidence in public institutions, particularly where trust is already fragile.

At the same time, advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and other emerging technologies are transforming economic activity, communication, security and conflict. These developments create opportunities but also raise operational, legal and ethical questions concerning accountability, responsible use and the capacity of institutions to keep pace with technological change.

The challenge is therefore broader than countering individual instances of information manipulation or regulating particular technologies. It concerns the ability of institutions and societies to adapt to the speed and scale of technological and informational change.

5. Climate Change and Systemic Vulnerability

Climate change is a cross-cutting source of vulnerability with economic, social, security and geopolitical implications. Climate-related pressures can affect food and energy security, infrastructure, economic development and disaster preparedness, while placing additional pressure on vulnerable communities and systems.

Both climate impacts and the costs of responding to them are distributed unevenly. Communities, regions and states with fewer resources may face greater difficulties in adapting and recovering, while the transition towards greater sustainability can create tensions involving competitiveness, industrial development, energy security and the distribution of costs.

Climate resilience therefore requires balancing long-term sustainability and adaptation with economic viability, competitiveness and social cohesion, while recognising differences in exposure and capacity across societies and regions.

Tensions and Areas of Divergence

The challenges above reveal strategic tensions that cannot be reduced to simple policy choices. They concern how competing objectives should be balanced as the Euro-Atlantic order adapts to a changing strategic environment.

A central tension exists between *interdependence and strategic resilience*. Reducing critical dependencies can strengthen resilience, while excessive self-sufficiency risks undermining the openness, partnerships and economic interdependence that remain sources of prosperity and influence.

Similarly, *greater capacity to act must be balanced with democratic accountability*. Less bureaucracy and faster decision-making may be necessary, but greater agility must remain compatible with transparency, institutional checks and meaningful democratic participation.

A further tension lies between *preserving and reforming the existing order*. Institutions, partnerships and principles remain foundations of Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation, while concerns about representation, consistency, effectiveness and legitimacy create pressure for adaptation. This is closely connected to the balance between *values-based policy and pragmatic engagement* with partners whose interests and perspectives differ.

Comparable trade-offs arise between *climate ambition and economic competitiveness*, particularly regarding the distribution of transition costs, and between *deeper Euro-Atlantic integration and legitimacy beyond the Euro-Atlantic community*. These tensions cannot be eliminated through a single policy choice. They will need to be continuously managed as the Euro-Atlantic order evolves.

10 Strategic Principles for Euro-Atlantic Resilience

1. Legitimacy through Consistency, Accountability and the Rule of Law

The legitimacy of democratic institutions and the wider Euro-Atlantic order depends on the principles they uphold and on their consistent application. The rule of law, democratic accountability, institutional independence and fundamental freedoms remain the backbone of democratic legitimacy. International credibility likewise depends on consistency between principles and practice.

2. Trust as a Foundation of Resilience

Trust is fundamental to democratic, societal and strategic resilience. It requires institutions to act transparently, accountably and effectively while remaining responsive to citizens. It also extends to relationships within societies, between institutions and among states.

3. Security as a Shared and Comprehensive Responsibility

Military defence remains the backbone of security, but threats increasingly interact with economic, technological, societal and environmental vulnerabilities. Security therefore also extends beyond the military domain. Resilience requires shared responsibility across institutions, sectors and society.

4. Strategic Resilience without Isolation

Resilience should not be equated with self-sufficiency. Prosperity and security depend on international trade, partnerships and interdependence, while concentrated dependencies create vulnerabilities. The objective should be ‘managed interdependence’: preserving openness while pragmatically diversifying and reducing critical dependencies.

5. Capacity to Act with Coherence and Agility

Strategic capacity requires clear priorities, timely decisions and the ability to translate commitments into action. Greater European capacity to act requires institutional effectiveness and political coordination while remaining compatible with democratic accountability and transparency.

6. Partnerships Based on Reciprocity and Diversification

Sustainable partnerships should be based on reciprocity, mutual interests and understanding of different partners' priorities and perspectives, including beyond the Euro-Atlantic community. Broader and more diversified partnerships can strengthen resilience, trust and international legitimacy.

7. An Adaptive and Balanced Transatlantic Relationship

The transatlantic relationship remains central to Euro-Atlantic security, but roles and responsibilities must adapt. A balanced partnership requires sustained transatlantic cooperation alongside greater European capacity and responsibility for its own security, based on fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge on both sides.

8. Inclusion and Agency at Every Level

Resilient and legitimate societies require meaningful participation. Local communities, municipalities, civil society and younger generations are not merely recipients of policy, but sources of knowledge, initiative and strategic capacity. Inclusion should extend beyond consultation towards responsibility and the ability to shape responses to shared challenges.

9. Values with Pragmatic and Context-Sensitive Engagement

Commitment to fundamental principles must coexist with pragmatic engagement in an international environment of different political systems, interests and perspectives. This requires distinguishing between core principles of democratic legitimacy and areas where flexibility, dialogue and compromise enable effective cooperation.

10. Shared Responsibility for Long-Term Transformation

Long-term resilience requires sustained responsibility across institutions, sectors, communities and generations. Strategic choices made today will shape the Euro-Atlantic order beyond 2035. Responsibility for adaptation must therefore extend beyond individual governments and policy cycles.

Strategic Priorities by Domain

1. Security and Defence

a. Strengthening defence capabilities and whole-of-society resilience

Europe needs the capacity to provide for its security in an environment where peace can no longer be taken for granted. This requires stronger defence capabilities, long-term preparedness and resilient societies capable of responding to major crises. Security must be treated as a shared responsibility across armed forces, public institutions, critical sectors and society.

b. Building a more coherent and inclusive Euro-Atlantic security architecture

Long-term stability requires a credible place for the Western Balkans within the wider Euro-Atlantic community. Clear and consistent pathways towards closer EU and NATO integration should reduce strategic uncertainty, strengthen regional integration and enable countries in the region to contribute more fully to the future Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

c. Strengthening European responsibility within an adaptive transatlantic partnership

Europe must develop greater capacity and responsibility for its security as the transatlantic relationship evolves. Stronger capabilities, defence industrial capacity, strategic investment and political-institutional capacity should reduce critical dependencies and enable Europe to assume a greater share of the common security burden while preserving a strong transatlantic partnership.

2. Democracy and Institutional Resilience

a. Safeguarding institutional integrity and the rule of law

Democratic resilience depends on the consistent application of the law, institutional independence, accountability and effective checks and balances. Strong and credible institutions are essential to sustaining public confidence and ensuring that democratic principles and fundamental freedoms are upheld in practice.

b. Strengthening democratic resilience against external interference

Democratic institutions and societies must be capable of withstanding foreign interference and external pressure without compromising the openness on which democratic systems depend. Institutional and societal resilience must therefore reinforce, rather than restrict, democratic values and fundamental freedoms.

c. Strengthening democratic trust and meaningful participation

Trust in democratic institutions depends on transparency, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness. Meaningful participation by communities, civil society and younger generations

can reduce the distance between citizens and decision-makers and strengthen democratic legitimacy and societal ownership.

3. Technology and the Information Space

a. Protecting trust and integrity in the information space

A resilient information environment is essential to democratic legitimacy, social cohesion and informed decision-making. The capacity to withstand disinformation, propaganda and AI-enabled manipulation should therefore form an integral part of democratic and societal resilience.

b. Strengthening collective detection, response and accountability

The cross-border and technologically sophisticated nature of information manipulation requires stronger collective capacity to detect, assess and respond to emerging threats. Greater coordination and accountability should strengthen resilience while safeguarding fundamental freedoms and open public debate.

c. Building societal resilience through digital, media and AI literacy

Long-term resilience depends on the capacity of individuals and communities to navigate an increasingly complex information environment. Digital, media and AI literacy should strengthen critical thinking, informed participation and the ability to recognise manipulation.

4. Economic Security and Supply Chains

a. Strengthening trusted and diversified economic partnerships

Economic resilience depends on stable, predictable and mutually beneficial relationships within Europe and with external partners. Diversification should reduce exposure to concentrated dependencies while preserving the benefits of international trade and interdependence.

b. Strengthening European cooperation and resilient supply chains

Greater cooperation within Europe should strengthen collective capacity in strategically important sectors and reduce vulnerabilities arising from fragmented national responses. Particular attention should be given to critical supply chains where disruption could have wider consequences.

c. Strengthening strategic economic decision-making capacity

Europe requires greater capacity to identify economic security priorities, make timely decisions and respond coherently to strategic disruption. Greater agility should strengthen Europe's ability to act while remaining compatible with democratic accountability and an open economic environment.

5. Climate and Disaster Resilience

a. Aligning the green transition with resilience, prosperity and competitiveness

The transition towards greater sustainability should be approached as a long-term economic and societal transformation, not merely as an environmental objective. Climate action should reinforce resilience, energy security, innovation, prosperity and competitiveness.

b. Ensuring a fair and territorially balanced transition

Climate impacts, adaptation capacities and transition costs are unevenly distributed across societies, regions and states. Long-term transformation should account for these differences and strengthen rather than undermine social and territorial cohesion.

c. Securing sustainable financing for mitigation, adaptation and disaster resilience

Long-term climate resilience requires sufficient and durable financing for mitigation, adaptation and disaster preparedness. Responsibility should be shared across states and economic actors, with financing capable of sustaining transformation over time.

6. Societal Cohesion and Youth Agency

a. Rebuilding social trust and institutional responsiveness

Social cohesion depends on trust and effective relationships between citizens, communities and institutions. More responsive institutions and stronger connections between public authorities and society should reinforce participation and collective capacity during periods of disruption.

b. Strengthening accessible public services and social resilience

Accessible public services and effective social protection provide foundations for security, dignity and social cohesion. Strong social systems should reduce vulnerability and create conditions in which citizens, particularly younger generations, can participate meaningfully in society and public life.

c. Strengthening meaningful youth agency and pathways to responsibility

Young people should be recognised as actors in present decision-making and long-term resilience. Youth agency requires meaningful opportunities to influence decisions, assume responsibility and progress into positions where expertise and participation can translate into tangible impact.

Policy Recommendations by Domain

The strategic principles and priorities should be translated into practical commitments that strengthen resilience, legitimacy and the capacity to act by 2035. The recommendations below provide concrete directions for implementation across the six domains. Individual recommendations may contribute to more than one priority. In the end, they provide practical pathways towards the strategic direction established for 2035 together.

1. Security and Defence

a. Strengthen Security Awareness and Strategic Communication

Governments should strengthen public understanding of the changing European security environment through education, awareness and strategic communication, while strengthening societal preparedness for major security disruptions. Security threats should be communicated openly and accurately, recognising that perceptions differ across countries according to geography, history and exposure to conflict. Policymakers, media and civil society must contribute to greater understanding of the need for investment in defence and security.

Indicators of progress: integration of security and preparedness into education and public-awareness initiatives; public understanding of security; participation in preparedness initiatives; reach and effects of strategic communication.

b. Ensure Clear and Credible Conditions for Euro-Atlantic Integration

Closer EU and NATO integration should be based on transparent and consistently applied criteria appropriate to each institution. In the Western Balkans, deeper integration should also encourage progress on outstanding bilateral disputes that constrain long-term regional stability and cooperation.

Indicators of progress: progress against established accession and partnership criteria; implementation of required reforms; progress in addressing outstanding bilateral disputes.

c. Strengthen European Security Capacity and Reduce Strategic Dependencies

Europe should strengthen its capacity to assume greater responsibility for its own security through stronger defence capabilities, strategic investments and defence industrial capacity. This must complement transatlantic cooperation while reducing critical dependencies through diversified partnerships.

Indicators of progress: Allied capability targets and industrial capacity; reduction of critical dependencies; diversification of strategic partnerships.

2. Democracy and Institutional Resilience

a. Strengthen Follow-Up to Persistent Rule-of-Law Deficiencies

Monitoring of serious rule-of-law deficiencies should be accompanied by clear and transparent follow-up within the relevant legal and institutional frameworks. Corrective processes should identify responsibilities, timelines and reporting requirements while respecting established procedures.

Indicators of progress: implementation of corrective measures; time required to address identified deficiencies; persistence of unresolved deficiencies.

b. Strengthen Preparedness against Pressure on Democratic Institutions

Governments and relevant institutions should periodically assess their preparedness for coordinated pressures including foreign interference, information manipulation, cyber disruption and attempts to undermine electoral processes. Identified vulnerabilities should inform institutional preparedness while safeguarding fundamental rights and democratic checks and balances.

Indicators of progress: vulnerabilities identified and addressed; corrective measures implemented; institutional preparedness assessed through exercises or reviews.

c. Strengthen Transparency and Meaningful Participation

Public institutions should strengthen transparency, accessibility and accountability, particularly in decisions with significant societal impact. Participation mechanisms should provide meaningful opportunities for citizens and civil society to contribute, with institutional follow-up to substantive public input made visible.

Indicators of progress: accessibility of participation mechanisms; institutional response rates and times; transparency of decision-making and follow-up.

3. Technology and the Information Space

a. Strengthen Euro-Atlantic Early Warning and Information-Sharing

Relevant institutions should strengthen coordinated capabilities to identify, assess and share information on significant information manipulation campaigns. Cooperation should distinguish between detection, attribution and public communication and include safeguards for freedom of expression and legitimate political debate.

Indicators of progress: detection and response times; cross-institutional information-sharing; participation in coordinated assessments.

b. Develop Common Accountability Standards for Harmful Information Manipulation

Common principles should clarify how deliberate, coordinated and harmful information manipulation is identified and addressed. Responses should be proportionate and transparent and clearly distinguish harmful manipulation from legitimate political disagreement and pluralism.

Indicators of progress: adoption of common definitions and standards; transparency reporting; independent review of major interventions.

c. Establish Digital, Media and AI Literacy as a Long-Term Priority

Digital, media and AI literacy should become a core component of societal resilience. Education systems, civil society and local communities should strengthen capacities to evaluate sources, recognise manipulated content, understand emerging technologies and use AI responsibly.

Indicators of progress: integration into education and training; participation in relevant programmes; demonstrated improvements in digital and information literacy.

4. Economic Security and Supply Chains

a. Establish a Framework for Managed Economic Interdependence

European institutions should develop a common approach to identifying, monitoring and managing critical external dependencies. This should distinguish between manageable dependencies, those requiring diversification and those presenting significant strategic risks, while preserving open trade and international cooperation where possible. Diversification should be pursued through reciprocal and mutually beneficial partnerships that take account of the interests and priorities of external partners.

Indicators of progress: critical dependencies mapped; diversification of high-risk dependencies; availability of alternative suppliers or capacities.

b. Strengthen Coordination on Critical Supply Chains

The EU and Member States should strengthen coordination on strategically important supply chains, particularly in food, energy, critical raw materials and semiconductors. Shared risk assessments, adequate reserves and coordinated preparedness should reduce fragmentation and improve collective resilience.

Indicators of progress: critical supply chains covered by common assessments; availability of contingency arrangements and reserves; recovery capacity following disruptions.

c. Strengthen Strategic Economic Decision-Making

European institutions should improve coordination and streamline procedures where fragmentation or unnecessary bureaucracy delay responses to strategic economic challenges.

Clearer responsibilities and faster implementation should strengthen institutional agility while maintaining regulatory standards, legal accountability and democratic oversight.

Indicators of progress: decision-making timelines; administrative burden in priority areas; implementation time for agreed strategic measures.

5. Climate and Disaster Resilience

a. Integrate Climate Resilience with Competitiveness and Energy Security

Climate policy should connect mitigation and adaptation with competitiveness, energy security, innovation and long-term economic resilience. Transition strategies should account for both the costs of inaction and the economic and societal implications of transition.

Indicators of progress: emissions intensity; energy dependence; investment in resilient infrastructure; economic and competitiveness indicators; broader measures of economic and societal progress, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI).

b. Strengthen Local and Regional Ownership of Resilience

Climate adaptation and disaster preparedness should reflect differences in local and regional vulnerabilities and capacities, while ensuring that transition costs and opportunities are addressed in a territorially balanced manner. Municipalities and regions should have meaningful roles in identifying priorities and adequate access to financing, expertise and technical support.

Indicators of progress: coverage and implementation of local and regional resilience plans; adaptation projects implemented; disaster-preparedness and response capacity.

c. Strengthen Sustainable Climate and Resilience Financing

More predictable financing should support mitigation, adaptation and disaster resilience, particularly in countries and communities with limited capacity to absorb transition costs. Financing mechanisms should distribute responsibility across public and private actors, including through contributions from corporations reflecting their global environmental footprint, and better connect available resources with long-term resilience needs.

Indicators of progress: predictability and scale of financing; implementation of funded mitigation and adaptation projects; measurable resilience outcomes.

6. Societal Cohesion and Youth Agency

a. Strengthen Accessibility and Quality of Essential Public Services

European and national authorities should improve the accessibility, quality and responsiveness of essential public services. Service delivery should be recognised as a component of democratic and societal resilience because citizens' everyday experience of institutions directly affects trust and social cohesion.

Indicators of progress: accessibility and waiting times; service performance; complaint-resolution rates; public satisfaction.

b. Ensure Meaningful Institutional Follow-Up to Youth Participation

Recognised youth participation mechanisms should include clear procedures for institutional follow-up. Substantive proposals should receive a response explaining how they were considered and, where appropriate, why they were accepted, adapted or not pursued. This strengthens the connection between participation and tangible influence without requiring institutions to accept individual proposals.

Indicators of progress: institutional response rates and times; transparency of follow-up; incorporation of youth input into policymaking.

c. Create Durable Pathways for Youth Leadership

Youth participation should be connected to opportunities for substantive responsibility through fellowships, advisory structures, project teams and other mechanisms providing practical experience in policymaking and implementation. These pathways should enable young professionals to develop and apply the capacity to analyse strategic challenges, negotiate interests, manage initiatives and translate priorities into action.

Indicators of progress: participation and completion rates; responsibilities assumed by young professionals; documented contributions to policy development and implementation.

Areas of Youth Agency and Leadership

Young professionals should be recognised as a present source of strategic capacity. Their expertise, perspectives and engagement can strengthen decision-making and the adaptability of Euro-Atlantic institutions and societies. Youth agency should therefore extend beyond representation to the ability to shape priorities and influence decisions. Four areas are particularly important:

1. Contributing to Decision-Making

Young professionals should have opportunities to contribute substantively to strategies, policies and institutional priorities through their expertise, research, practical experience and informed judgement, rather than being limited to representing the interests of their generation.

2. Assuming Responsibility and Leadership

Meaningful youth leadership requires pathways from participation to responsibility. Young professionals should be able to take ownership of initiatives, contribute to implementation and assume responsibility for decisions and outcomes.

3. Applying Expertise, Innovation and Adaptability

Young professionals can contribute particular value in areas characterised by rapid change and uncertainty. Their expertise can help institutions identify emerging developments, challenge established assumptions and translate new knowledge into practical responses.

4. Connecting Generations, Institutions and Societies

Intergenerational and cross-border engagement can connect institutional experience with new perspectives, strengthen knowledge transfer and build relationships across institutions, sectors, communities and countries.

Strategic Direction towards 2035

The Young Euro-Atlantic Resilience Strategy 2035 sets out a progression from risk to principle, from principle to priority, and from priority to action. The structural challenges identified across the six domains are interconnected and should not be addressed in isolation. The ten Strategic Principles thus provide a common framework for pursuing the domain-specific priorities and translating them into practical commitments.

Taken together, the Strategy points towards a Euro-Atlantic order that is more resilient without becoming isolated, more capable without compromising democratic accountability, and more adaptable without abandoning the principles on which its legitimacy depends. This requires stronger security and preparedness, trusted and responsive institutions, responsible and credible decision-making, resilience to technological and information disruption, managed strategic interdependence, sustainable climate transformation and cohesive societies capable of meaningful participation.

Implementation should follow the same logic. The Strategic Principles should guide how choices are made; the Strategic Priorities define the direction of change; the Policy Recommendations identify practical pathways towards them; and the Indicators of Progress provide a basis for assessing whether that direction is being translated into action. Young professionals, institutions and societies all have a role in sustaining this process beyond individual policy cycles.

Hence, the objective for 2035 is not the preservation of the Euro-Atlantic order as it existed before the rupture, but its capacity to defend what remains essential, adapt what must change and rethink what no longer meets the demands of a transformed strategic environment. This is the transition from rupture to agency.

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